The archaeology of knowledge. (World of man). Translation of archeologie du savoir. Includes the author's The Discourse on Language, translation of ordre du . File:Foucault Michel Archaeology of cotubesina.ml cotubesina.ml (file size: MB, MIME type . The Archaeology of Knowledge. by. Michel Foucault. Identifier TheArchaeologyOfKnowledge. Identifier-arkark://t72v8ph3f. OcrABBYY.
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Michel Foucault (). The Archæology of Knowledge. Chapter 1. The Unities of Discourse. Source: The Archaeology of Knowledge (), publ. Routledge. Get this from a library! The archaeology of knowledge. [Michel Foucault; Alan Sheridan] -- In France, a country that awards its intellectuals the status other. PDF | In this paper, I attempt to look back at Michel Foucault's thought in ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND GENEALOGY OF POWER.
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The archaeology of knowledge Author: Michel Foucault ; Alan Sheridan Publisher: New York: Print book: In France, a country that awards its intellectuals the status other countries give their rock stars, Michel Foucault was part of a glittering generation of thinkers, one which also included Sartre, de Beauvoir and Deleuze. One of the great intellectual heroes of the twentieth century, Foucault was a man whose passion and reason were at the service of nearly every progressive cause of his time.
From law and order, to mental health, to power and knowledge, he spearheaded public awareness of the dynamics that hold us all in thrall to a few powerful ideologies and interests. Arguably his finest work, Archaeology of Knowledge is a challenging but fantastically rewarding introduction to his ideas. Read more Allow this favorite library to be seen by others Keep this favorite library private.
Find a copy in the library Finding libraries that hold this item Details Additional Physical Format: Online version: Foucault, Michel, Archaeology of knowledge. Michel Foucault ; Alan Sheridan Find more information about: Michel Foucault Alan Sheridan. Reviews User-contributed reviews Add a review and share your thoughts with other readers.
Be the first. Add a review and share your thoughts with other readers. Similar Items Related Subjects: Knowledge, Sociology of. Power Social sciences Discourse analysis. It is these rules of formation, which were never formulated in their own right, but are to be found only in widely differing theories, concepts, and objects of study, that I have tried to reveal, by isolating, as their specific locus, a level that I have called, somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, archaeological Foucault b, xi.
Foucault conceives of these changes not as a continuous progress in the development of scientific truth in which we get ever closer to the true knowledge of things, but as breaks, ruptures, or transformations at the archaeological level. This will pave the way for the discussion on the construction of the economy in the history of economic discourse, because Foucault follows similar lines in his archaeological reading of the history of these different disciplines.
For Kant, the a priori elements of reason have a dual character.
They allow human minds to achieve the knowledge of things, i. Kant, in other words, analyzes the conditions of possibility of knowledge in terms of their positivity and negativity: what makes knowledge possible imposes at the same time its limits upon what and how we can know.
This epistemological problem takes on a historical and discursive, i. To the modern mind, this constitution of madness as an illness is nothing but the recognition of an objective reality which will eventually mitigate the sufferings of the mad through appropriate treatment in the asylum Gutting For Foucault, however, the dissolution of the confinement system and the beginning of the asylum life for the mad was based upon the imperative of social control and manipulation of those who did not conform to morals and economic practices of modern bourgeois society.
In The birth of clinic, he explains, in a similar fashion, the transformations that occurred in the perception of illness at the turn of modernity. This would allow the doctor to capture the nature of illness more easily; whereas in the hospital where different illnesses would intermingle with each other, the nature of the illness would change through this interaction, making treatment more difficult. Illness, as the object of modern medical science, was stripped of its ideal existence independent of the body and located in particular organs, tissues, and the like.
This development gave rise to the establishment of modern clinical practice in which illness is treated at the hospital at its specific locality in the human body.
In his archaeological analysis of psychiatric and medical discourse, Foucault shows that the knowledge relation which the human mind establishes with reality is mediated through historical and discursive elements. He is rather concerned with understanding upon what historical and discursive a priori structures conditions of scientificity arise; i. It is within such set of problematic issues that the analysis of the discursive constitution of madness and illness acquires its significance.
But where exactly does the Foucauldian project of archaeology stand in relation to epistemology, especially when one considers that Foucault is rather reluctant to counterpose the two? The tension between archaeology and epistemology can be best explored I suggest, along three different lines. Foucault, however, does not pose the problem of knowledge in reference to or from the perspective of an abstract epistemological subject.
He is rather interested in understanding the discursive rules of scientificity that the practitioners of science unconsciously adhere to in different historical time periods. The idea of scientific progress where we get closer and closer to the true knowledge of objective reality is displaced, therefore, by the discourse-specificity of our knowledge of things.
For Foucault, in other words, the operation of power in society—for example the social control of those who do not conform to the practices and values of bourgeois society, as mentioned above—is an integral element of claims to knowledge and of the historical production of truth. True, Foucault never problematizes his archaeology in its relation to and tension with epistemology. However, his account of the history of such disciplines as psychiatry and medicine, and economics as I shall try to explicate in the next section, demonstrates that there is much in the problem of knowledge and the actual practices of science that the epistemological framework fails to capture.
The relation between archaeology and the descriptive frameworks of the philosophy of science Lakatosian research program and Kuhnian paradigm is, however, more complicated. It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into this debate, but allow me to state very briefly that I see both important similarities, as well as differences between these two frameworks. Just like Kuhn, Foucault maintains that scientific practice includes elements that go beyond epistemologically-authorized norms of scientificity.
This allows him, for example, to explicitly problematize how and with respect to what discursive rules reality is constructed as the object of scientific analysis, a problem that does not arise in the descriptive branch of the philosophy of science. Knowing things in the Renaissance episteme consisted therefore in deciphering the signs imprinted into things which indicated the system of resemblance between them.
There exists a sympathy between aconite and our eyes. This unexpected affinity would remain in obscurity if there were not some signature on the plant [its seeds], some word, as it were, telling us that it is good for diseases of the eye.
The knowledge that aconite could be used to cure eye diseases was based upon the sympathy, as a form of affinity, between the plant and the eyes. This sympathy could be known because of another form of resemblance as its sign, whose explanatory power was justified within the discursive structure of the Renaissance episteme itself: the resemblance between eyes and the seeds of the plant.
There were no boundaries to the play of signs and resemblances in making the world, or rather the order of things, intelligible to us in the Renaissance. As far as economic discourse is concerned, the value of money and its role as the medium of exchange was based upon the intrinsic preciousness of the metal used. Money had a price and could function as the measure of all other prices because the monetary substance was of itself precious; and in its brightness the metal carried the sign of its own preciousness and worth.
Foucault, Michel - The Archaeology of Knowledge
Consequently, the order of things for the classical episteme meant a taxonomy where things had their proper places in accordance not with their inherent signs, but with a representation of their identities and differences. These identities and differences, i. The sciences always carry within themselves the project [ This ordering, however, need not be quantitative. Foucault disagrees with the traditional account of the classical period as engaged in the mathematization of nature.
The classical episteme was rather based on a mathesis, a general order of things which involved both quantitative and qualitative elements.
The fundamental principle was not mathematization, but an ordering of things on a non-historical table through the representation of their commonalities and dissimilarities. He argues that in their investigations these three disciplines adhered to the main rules and regularities of the classical episteme.
As we shall discuss below, Foucault uses the same metaphor in his analysis of the realm of exchange in the classical period. In particular, he argues that the realm of exchange constitutes an order in reference to the exchange of equivalences where things are represented through the monetary substance in accordance to their identities and differences in economic value.
It was their proper places in this classification according to the common elements they possessed which constituted knowledge of living beings. The mercantilist literature analyzed wealth in its relation to money as the representation of wealth within the sphere of exchange, and this was, for Foucault, in line with the general characteristics of the classical episteme based on the representation of identities equivalences and differences.
And since money was the universal representation of wealth in the realm of exchange—on this table of equivalences—it is not surprising to Foucault that mercantilists identified money with wealth: If it was possible to believe that mercantilism confused wealth and money, this is probably because money for the mercantilists had the power of representing all possible wealth, because it was the universal instrument for the analysis and representation of wealth [ All wealth is coinable; and it is by this means that it enters into circulation—in the same way that any natural being was characterizable, and could thereby find its place in a taxonomy [ If the mercantilists did not analyze wealth within a conception of the economy based on the realm of production, this was not because they were not aware of this realm, nor was it because they thought production was not significant enough to merit a place in the analysis of wealth.
The reason, to Foucault, was that they conducted their analysis with respect to a particular discursive construction of the economy that rested upon the realm of exchange, upon a non-historical table of equivalences, where wealth circulated in the form of money as the universal representation of wealth.
The relation was reversed in the classical period: whereas in the Renaissance episteme gold and silver could represent wealth due to their intrinsic value, in the classical period they had value as monetary instruments due to their function in the realm of exchange to represent wealth. Modern economic discourse There was another break, Foucault claims, at the archaeological level of Western knowledge at the turn of the 19th century.
In the modern period, knowing things was not directed towards their representation in a non-historical table of classification, but upon their existence in real historical time. This is how knowledge of things became linked in the modern episteme to our understanding of their historical laws of development.
It was the same change, according to Foucault, that consequently allowed biology to introduce life and historicity into the understanding of living beings, to study both the development of organisms and the origin of species.
In economics, the sphere of production eclipsed that of exchange, with all its accompanying elements of labor, capital, division of labor, accumulation, and the like.
All economic categories and problems, that is to say, came to be defined and investigated in terms of their relation to the realm of production. Whereas in the classical period value was determined within the system of exchange—within a non-historical cycle of equivalences—where money functioned as the universal representation of wealth, in modern economics value was linked to the productive activity of the human being, i.
The laboring activity, moreover, was dependent upon the means of production, division of labor, the amount of capital invested, and so on, which themselves were related to past labor and to its historical productive organization Gutting The break Foucault locates between the classical and modern periods provides us with some new insights into classical political economy.
In Adam Smith, labor occupies a prominent place, consistent with the ascendancy of the realm of production over the sphere of exchange in economic analysis. It was Ricardo, Foucault claims, who initiated the decisive break from the classical episteme in economic discourse. For him, the quantity of labor still determined the value of things, but this was not because labor represents wealth, but because labor, as an activity, is the source of value Foucault, b.
Wealth, which circulates in the sphere of exchange in the form of labor, determines the division of labor and hence has its effect on the realm of production.
In a similar fashion, mercantilists have been accused of confusing money with wealth; the popularity of that critique being largely driven by Smith himself. Karl Marx, though acknowledging his debt to the important figures in classical political economy, argues that there are elements in his own theoretical structure that constitute a decisive break from classical political economy.
Unlike his own analysis, Marx therefore argues, political economy studies the historical economic relations of capitalism as if they were the natural and eternal conditions of human existence. To make his point, Foucault draws our attention to three important consequences of the conception of labor in Ricardian discourse.
The first, already mentioned, is the determination of value through a series of historical events where both past and current labor play their respective parts within the historical organization of production. The second concerns the notion of scarcity and the position of the human being in the face of scarcity. The third consequence concerns the relation of this human finitude to history. And this history will lead for Ricardo to a stationary state where there is no prospect for further development.
The finitude of the human being, however, has a positive aspect for Foucault in the Kantian sense that what limits our knowledge of things makes at the same time this knowledge possible.
It is the discursive construction of the human being in its finitude, in its limitation by scarcity, Foucault emphasizes, that makes modern economic discourse possible. Human finitude creates, therefore, the conditions of possibility of modern economics: in its finitude the modern human being establishes itself as a unified, centered, and rational subject, thereby creating a space where modern economics becomes possible as a human science.
Whatever their future projections, however, Foucault argues that both Ricardo and Marx see history as the struggle of the laboring subject to survive under the conditions of fundamental scarcity. In Ricardo, scarcity, hence human finitude, presents itself in historical time as increasing quantities of labor become necessary to produce the same amount of output due to diminishing returns.
The Archæology of Knowledge
In that area where, in the past, history deciphered the traces left by men, it now deploys a mass of elements that have to be grouped, made relevant, placed in relation to one another to form totalities; it might be said, to play on words a little, that in our time history aspires to the condition of archaeology, to the intrinsic description of the monument.
It has now become one of the basic elements of historical analysis. The project of a total history is one that seeks to reconstitute the overall form of a civilization The problem that now presents itself -- and which defines the task of a general history -- is to determine what form of relation may be legitimately described between these different series A total description draws all phenomena around a single centre To the various statuses, the various sites, the various positions that he can occupy or be given when making a discourse.
To the discontinuity of the planes from which he speaks At least spare us their morality when we write. Or again: instead of reconstituting chains of inference as one often does in the history of the sciences or of philosophy , instead of drawing up tables of differences as the linguists do , it would describe systems of dispersion. It is constitutive of the statement itself: a statement must have a substance, a support, a place, and a date.
And when these requisites change, it too changes identity. For a statement may be the same, whether written on a sheet of paper or published in a book; it may be the same spoken, printed on a poster, or reproduced on a tape-recorder; on the other hand, when a novelist speaks a sentence in daily life, then reproduces the same sentence in the manuscript that he is writing, attributing it to one of his characters, or even allowing it to be spoken by that anonymous voice that passes for that of the author, one cannot say that it is the same statement in each case.
The rule of materiality that statements necessarily obey is therefore of the order of the institution rather than of the spatio-temporal localization; it defines possiblities of reinscription and transcription but also thresholds and limit , rather than limited and perishable individualities.
The right of words - which is not that of the philologists - authorizes, therefore, the use of the term archaeology to describe all these searches. This term does not imply the search for a beginning; it does not relate analysis to geological excavation. It designates the general theme of a description that questions the already-said at the level of its existence: of the enunciative function that operates within it, of the discursive formation, and the general archive system to which it belongs.
Archaeology describes discourses as practices specified in the element of the archive. But archaeological description is precisely such an abandonment of the history of ideas, a systematic rejection of its postulates and procedures, an attempt to practice quite a different history of what men have said.Being rules, the "statement" has a special meaning in the Archaeology: To be brief, then, let us say that history, in its traditional form, undertook to 'memorise' the monuments of the past, transform them into documents, and lend speech to those traces which, in themselves, are often not verbal, or which say in silence something other than what they actually say; in our time, history is that which transforms documents into monuments.
The archaeological approach proposed by Foucault defines a discourse by its specific manifestation, and, not by its undercurrent, or by its hidden ideas. Its description is not the aim of archaeological analysis. It is the discursive construction of the human being in its finitude, in its limitation by scarcity, Foucault emphasizes, that makes modern economic discourse possible.